Mobilization for a new era

Introduction
I am honoured by the invitation to this conference. Let me start with a
confession. I do not know what IW is. Once I tried to understand, what is IW,
and I thought I knew a little bit about it but the more I have studied the area, the
more I realize that I don’t know what it really is. It is not every day that you are
asked to talk about a subject you don’t know and to do so in front of such a
distinguished audience and together with such learned speakers and in a
language that is not your own.
An other point is that everything changes so rapidly today. Today’s
generation is the “click and go“ generation zapping around in the globally
connected world. You then find that when you have written down some new
thoughts of yours in order to publish, the subject often is already out on the
Internet and a matter for discussion the world around.
In this awkward situation I am reminded of what an American colonel told
me some time ago. He had performed a study on how much people really listen
to a presentation .at a seminar or a conference. He had found out that just about
10 % of the audience were still listening to the speaker after he had spoken a few
minutes. Instead roughly 40 % of the audience were thinking about what they
should do when the speaker finished and about 50 % of the audience were,
awake or asleep, having sexual fantasy pictures in their minds. Of course, this
was an American study and you can’t be sure it holds good in Denmark.
Let me make one more confession. The opinions I express are my personal
views and do not necessarily reflect those of my employer, The Defence
Materiel Administration or the Swedish Defence Forces. However, this does not
exclude the possibility that some of the thoughts are in agreement with official
opinion.
Mobilization! Yes indeed, mobilization for a new era, because so much has
changed and will change. We must do something dramatically different. Firstly,
we must mobilize our minds to trying to understand and analyse what is going
on. There is a number of areas to study and I will point at some of them.
 

The deepest power shift
Let me start by asking you if you have seen this before? “We stand on the edge
of the deepest powershift in human history“ (Alvin Toffler, 1990).
Well, not too many seem to have come across the citation. The question then
is, do you believe that he is right? He talks about power involving the use of
violënce or force (which in parenthesis is the monopoly of defence forces), the
use of wealth and the use of knowledge. He talks about a shift from the
inflexible and low quality power of force and the versatile medium quality
wealth, towards application of knowledge being the most versatile and high
quality power. Actor Sean Connery, in a film set in Cuba during the reign of the
dictator Batista, plays a British mercenary. In a memorable scene the tyrant’s
military chief says: “Major, tell me what your favourite weapon is, and I’ll get it
for you.“ To which Connery replies: “Brains.“
Of course, this is already known. In most IW literature there are citations
from Sun Zu, so I will rather remind you of a couple of others: “The sword is
beaten by the mind“ (Napoleon). “Empires o f the future are the empires of the
mind“ (Winston Churchill).
So, is there really anything new to all this, are we really on the edge of the
deepest powershift in human history? Well, knowledge is a force multiplier. By
new means, new technological means used in new ways, not just to make
everything a little bit better or more efficient but rather to create new ways of
doing things, this multiplier is also a tremendous amplifier. We are not
redesigning the past, we are inventing the future.
New technology will revolutionize human life. Man can be symbolized by
senses, thoughts, communication and actions. Senses can be expanded by a
global network of sensors. High fidelity technical sensors that can see, feel,
listen, taste and smell in a global network of sensors. People in the armed forces
are enthusiastic about dominant battle-space knowledge in order to gain
information and decision superiority. I am convinced the UN and the diplomatic
corps would be enthusiastic if they would have a forewarning surveillance
system for emerging conflicts. Such emerging conflicts could be mitigated by
means of knowledge and not of force. Just as an example, already today, there
are unmanned aerial vehicles carrying synthetic aperture radar with a resolution
of one foot, able to see through clouds, day and night and able to transmit
pictures in real time globally through satellite networks. And there are many
other types of sensors, some of which come from the Walt Disney industries like
Jurassic Park.
OK, man’s thoughts are also expanded with the aid of computers and global
computer networks. Man’s communication will never be like before.
Communication is expanded with the aid of global communication networks, the
fibre optic cables, the satellites, the Internet, the television media. By
communication, information is spread around the globe by speed of light, far
exceeding our speed of thoughts. Shimon Peres once said: “The greatest change
in our time has not been effected by armies or states or international
organisations; it has been driven by the spread o f information. “ Information is a
catalyst for our human actions and now we can see many means of expanding
action far beyond the reach of our hands. As a matter of fact, the example is
often given of the lonely teenage computer hacker being able to cause
troublesome events on the other side of the globe by the tap of a finger on a
keyboard. In summary, we see a number of technological aids expanding human
senses, thoughts, communication and actions to a global scale. This will have an
impact on our lives.

Power shift in military defence
In respect of the military defence we experience more and more information and
knowledge being embedded in weapons and surveillance technologies. Don’t
look upon a fighter plane as a fighter plane, look upon it as a flying computer
centre with a weapons cargo. And in many instances wars will be fought not
with bullets and powder but with electrons and photons. A small TV transmitter
on the helmet of the soldier of the future can happen to be more powerful than
his machine-gun. A high power microwave (HPM) tank, such as this old Russian
one, can ruin the information power of an opponent.
We experience a shift from a platform centric defence to an information
centric defence. Brain work, human and machine - is today’s precondition for
military power. A precondition to win land, sea and air power is to win
information power and superiority, to put this into decision power and
superiority and to use this for action power and superiority. And this is actually
the way we work or will work in small as in big, in peace and in conflict.
With computers and communications and information transferred into
electrons and photons we experience extremely rapid servants delivering
messages by the speed of light. As the number of these servants increase we are
faced with an ever increasing tempo in the electronic or cyber space. As human
beings we will experience more and more difficulty in coping with this
increasing tempo and this will change much of our life. It will become a matter
of life or death in conflict and war.
Knowledge wins over hierarchy, the days of the old fortifications and
pyramids are gone, the days of the hierarchical organisations are gone. Hierarchy
does not respond rapidly enough in a high speed situation, and speed increases.
Tempo wins over hierarchy. Hierarchy is anti-creation. Creation, fantasy,
innovation will be the most needed sources of the future.
OK, so far, did I talk about information warfare? Maybe some of i t , maybe
about knowledge warfare, the ultimate reach for power, maybe about roads to
knowledge power, about information operations and not yet about information
assurance. There are a number of new names and definitions around. Almost
everyone, and especially large organizations want a solid definition to cling to.
In my opinion all this brings no end state, all these terms and definitions are only
road signs on a neverending travel towards the future. I will be very frightened
when someone says “Now we are finished, we have set the rules and we will
stick to them.“ However, such a view has been part of military culture so far.

The knowledge battle-space
Why will I be frightened when someone says we have finally defined everything
and set the rules? Let me explain my view on the knowledge battle-space. In my
view the knowledge battle-space consists of four types of knowledge.
Firstly, there is the knowledge established by what we know that we know. I
would call it loud knowledge.
Secondly there is also the knowledge established by what we know that we
don’t know. I would call it loud ignorance. Together they form the perfect
foundation for the planners, the rule takers, those who want to define everything
and stick to it. Personally, I would name this Titanic, because in the end it will
always fail. Sooner or later something unknown comes up, change is the only
sure thing in life. Mark Twain once said that for those who only have a hammer
as a tool, all problems look like nails. Well, in war, if the opponent knows all
your rules, you will be lost. It will be as if a chess player has the knowledge of
everything the opponent thinks. What you have to do is to do the unexpected and
take the opponent by surprise. That is the essence of war gaming.
And there are two more types of knowledge. The black types. The first one
has to do with what you don’t know that you actually know. Not until you are
faced with a new situation and you do something, you will find out that you are
actually able to handle it. This is the silent knowledge. Nobody can see the holes
where there is no pattern of action. It is hard to animate elusive patterns where
most surprises spring up. In order to find out more about silent knowledge, you
need to do mental stretching. Think about those words ’’mental stretching”, when
did you last do so? You were probably jogging and did some body stretching,
but when did you do the mental one? When you did, you were the rule breaker,
the anarchist according to the vocabulary of the rule taker. This is an important
kind of knowledge that you should try to experience more of in the future. It is
needed in the information and knowledge era and especially fruitful in conflicts.
Last but not least there is a something characterized as what you don’t know
that you don’t know. I would call it silent ignorance. This is a particularly
interesting region. We are talking about areas where there is no pattern of action.
It is like dropping your keys at night and only searching for them where there is
light enabling you to see. Now, if you get in contact with people busy in areas
not previously known to you, you will experience new things. This means that
you will be able to make cross-cultural excursions into this type of silent
ignorance and be able to capture new knowledge. Think about it!
So, what should you do, should you be the rule taker or the rule breaker, the
passenger on the Titanic or the anarchist? I guess none of them is good for ever,
you will have to try to balance between the bright and the dark sides according
to what wisdom you have.
Power is the target of war. The centre of gravity shifts towards knowledge in
order to achieve power. Knowledge is a force multiplier and thus of great value.
The road to knowledge can pass refinement from bits, symbols, data,
information, perception, signification to knowledge and even to wisdom. One
could say that information is bits and pieces “in formation“. People are mind
driven and information can influence mind. We can talk about mental influence
and attack in the knowledge battle-space; about using information as
ammunition or not providing information in order to win an argument; to win a
duel between minds and thus to master a situation and achieve power. This can
be performed on an individual level, an organizational, a national and an
international level.
Information itself is of no particular value. It can attain a value, positive or
negative, when being used. It should be regarded as part of a process where
relevant information leads to decision and in turn to action. Information can be
regarded as a catalyst for a decision process. This in turn starts two main
processes. One is the action process and the other is the learning or knowledge
process. In order to own a situation one must be able to control the input of
information, make the right decision and be in control of the action and the
learning processes. In IW and 10 all these parts containing information can be
under attack.
A struggle between opponents is about obtaining enough correct information
- own the information - and - based on previous knowledge in combination with
speedy comprehension and intuition making decisions earlier and better than an
adversary - own the initiative -, carrying out actions based on the decisions -
own the situation - and learning from the results in order to have better
knowledge than before, when faced with new situations - own the knowledge.
Knowledge is half the victory, wisdom is eternal peace. In the struggle, the mind
of the leader of the opposition is the target and all in all it may be regarded as
mental attacks aimed at influencing the opponents decision loop which is then
the centre of the attacks. In order to attack a large system with many cooperating
parts IW and 10 can require concerted actions of attack of the different
parts. Such joint operations involve a number of management problems.

In search of definitions
To some people information warfare is a generic term for all forms of struggle
for control and superiority concerning information. Ultimately it could be the
struggle of minds in order to become master of a situation. In a very wide view
one deals with many levels of interaction, phases of conflict, and arenas.
According to one source there are three classes of level: personal, corporate, and
global IW. An other division is individual, organizational or tactical, national or
operative, international or strategic, and global. In a wide sense IW appears
during all phases of conflict from co-operation, competition, crises, war to postconflict.
The arenas can be military, political, diplomatic, economic, social,
infrastructure, criminal, ideological and religious and possibly more. There are
several forms or methods of warfare, a multitude of technologies, goals and
targets.
Information warfare can begin without a declaration of war and can be
fought on a wide front or battlefield - openly or subversively, isolated or
widespread. Information operations can stretch over all phases, from peace,
crisis or conflict to actual war and pursuing conflicts. This totality makes the
concept complicated and multidimensional atnd places high demands on the
expansion of our field of vision in all directions, to include all the phases of a
conflict, at all levels and in all sectors of society. This forms a palette with
greater possibilities and threats, with a greater number of targets and wider
battlefields than ever before.
There is also talk of a more restricted application of information warfare.
The actors can then be separate organisations, groups or simply individuals
instead of being alliances and states. They can achieve their purpose without
having to resort to conventional threats or means of pressure. This makes the
boundaries indistinct between the concepts, competition, rivalry, peace, crisis
and war. It's been said that a few clever hackers or insiders could paralyze a
high-tech nation within a very short space of time.
The meaning of IW changes all the time and brings my thoughts to the
Greek mythology where Hercules was fighting a hydra with many heads that
regrew when cut off IW has also been compared with the story of blind men
touching an elephant in order to try to describe what they think it really is.
Depending on what they feel, each of them will come up with different ideas.
There is no consensus of definitions and one could even talk about a definition
warfare. Definitions establish conditions which can prevent looking for new
patterns of behaviour and development in a cheinging environment.
All in all, this is very confusing and the generic term IW is no longer very
well appreciated. One interpretation is that IW is a war constantly going on, also
when there is no war in traditional terms. Thus the US military defence would be
almost constantly engaged in “war“ because of its continuous efforts to achieve
information dominance over any adversary. Many incidents occur without a
declared act of war, such as those from college kid hackers. For this reason the
US military version of IW is restricted to information operations in crises and
conflict. The sweeping use of the term IW is not very helpful and should in my
opinion not be used in a military context.
During conflict or war, information and knowledge have always been key
parameters. This is why information warfare is in fact nothing new as a
phenomenon.
However, what is new today, are primarily these factors:

  • Widespread expansion of fields of activity and global connections.
  • Interaction and synchronisation embracing all important areas.
  • The effects of amplification and intensification through information technology.
  • The increasingly high tempo in a course of events.
  • The emphasis (especially in the USA) on reduced casualties.

The increasing importance of information makes it a clear, primary target
for warfare. This is one reason why modem information warfare is a highly
topical subject for debate. The opposite of information warfare is not particularly
under debate. One major root of conflicts is lack of confidence. Confidencebuilding
measures are becoming extremely important in solving conflicts.
Instead of engaging in information warfare one should develop a number of
positive means of using information. For this reason the whole region of
producing confidence-building information ought to be studied, developed and
used.

The effects of information warfare
The destructive and extensive effect that information warfare can have on an
information society is hard to imagine. We need computer support for electrical
power supplies, telecommunications, water supplies, sewage, heating, air and rail
transport services, daily newspapers, social insurance, taxation and banking
procedures, and much more - in fact, for the entire infrastructure. Electric power
networks and communication networks are the blood vessels and the nervous
systems of society and are controlled by computers without which catastrophe is
near. When the networks break down, everyone goes down with them. Only
when faced with an all electric power black out such as in 1983 Sweden started
to realize the chain reactions of electronic systems black out and further
consequences for the infrastructure. If the telecommunications hub and conduits
in the World Trade Centre in New York City had been damaged during the 1994
attack on the trade centre, this would have had a disastrous effect on billions of
US dollars propagating throughout the world.
Experimenting with a complex information society is certainly easy with the
technical means at our disposal today, but to achieve the intended effect is
virtually impossible. Here there are clear parallels with nuclear weapons and
biological warfare. The extent of dispersion and long term effects of such
operations cannot be predicted nor restricted. Information as a weapon is double
edged and can strike back against the aggressor. It is not unlikely that
information warfare activities in the end will have a greater negative effect on
the aggressor than on those attacked if the aggressor himself is strongly
dependent on information technology and the attacked is a “backward“ nation.
Human behaviour will always be less predictable than technical circumstances.
It would be a grave error in judgement to believe that information
warfare is so superior, it will contribute towards solving all military conflicts.
This is a real problem but not well recognised by everyone. The will of man
depends on human values and cultures and is more difficult to understand than
technological systems. The straightforward military aspects of information
warfare are not particularly effective in those cases, where the cultural
differences of the actors are substantial and where the difference in IT
dependence is great. There are many examples of homogenous groups, ethnic as
well as religious, and with deeply rooted moral codes, which cannot be defeated
by information warfare. On the other hand, their power of mass media is in their
favour and thus can reinforce their own opinions.

Information warfare drawbacks
IW has several important drawbacks:

  • Trust as one of the most fundamental cornerstones of human civilisation is violated. Involvement in information warfare such that the final outcome is loss of trust can be very expensive indeed.
  • An underhanded expansion of IW in civilian society blurs the boundaries for everyday competition and is a kind of war fought without declaration of war.
  • Information warfare legitimises terrorism. If governments and actors in society, ambitious to be respected by the people, believe it OK for them to engage in information warfare, this will become the final victory for terrorism.
  • The effects of information warfare are unpredictable. To achieve the intended effect is virtually impossible. Human behaviour is far less predictable than technical circumstances.

Driving forces of information warfare and information operations
There are three main reasons why IW and 10 have attained interest and have
become driving forces.
One thought is that IW can lead to less bloodshedding. There is a dislike of
casualties, especially if the motivation to participate in a conflict is low. Media is
quick and powerful and can intensify effects of losses and influence opinions.
Politically IW and 10 may be attractive if trust is not harmed.
Another thought is that IW can lead to less cost than using other means of
fighting. In some cases there could be a dramatic cost reduction. For example a
treacherous chip in a telephone line can cause more harm than a number of
bombs, and the restoration cost after the conflict can be minimal.
Still another thought is that information technology such as computers and
communication systems is a phenomenal tool revolutionizing the ways we work
and thus both a force multiplier and a source for new capabilities.

Swedish activities
Sweden has established a Cabinet working group on IW and reports have been
produced. The main proposals of the first report are the following:

  • Economy must be regarded as a national security asset.
  • There is a need for a coherent overview which implies an integrated strategic-economic analysis within the Cabinet and a need for a unit that can get an overall picture of the hidden statistics relating to ITintrusions.
  • There is also a need for a coherent governmental responsibility at the inter-agency level and a proposal for a co-ordination group within the Cabinet.
  • Several issues are presently in progress. One of them concerns the development of a policy.
  • Another concerns the future organization and structure. A question is who will be in charge of the work. What is the character of work? Is this an intelligence or an operational matter? Should there be a new agency or a new function hosted by an established agency? Today, there are strong criteria for a “leading agency“. Programs are needed for awareness, education, training and the development of a national “Red Team“ unit. Other issues are funding for security and redundancy incentives.
  • Internationally there are challenges for international law, for example concerning the use of force, and also challenges concerning regimes for international co-operation. Of interest are doctrines concerning the use of IO/IW under UN or other international legal auspices. What could be discussed are international operations or upholding sanctions. Also of interest are principles of building regimes for defensive actions taken in cyberspace. This could involve actions like tracing and counterhacking. Some of these thoughts have been brought up at a previous workshop in Sweden.
  • The time frame for the Swedish studies are that a parliamentary ad-hoc committee on defence should issue a white paper in the spring of 1999 and a Cabinet Bill be presented to Parliament in the fall of 1999.

Emphasizing the Information Defence
If it is true that we are standing on the edge of the deepest powershift in human
history we need rethinking military business. A new starting point and idea is to
emphasize the importance of information forces by creating the Information
Defence. The Information Defence constitutes a new military force appearing as
an integrated distinct and profound ingredient in - and force multiplier of - land,
sea and air forces serving as cement to join together land, sea, air and
information operations and also coalition forces and civil society.
There are several reasons to introduce the Information Defence:

  • A prerequisite to conquer land, sea and air is to conquer the information and knowledge battle-space. This requires a shift from a platformcentric defence to an information-centric defence with information transparency and interoperability as features for the forces.
  • Information forces are needed to fight enemy information forces. If one party is equipped with information weapons and the other is not, the competitive arena is sharply tilted. What should one do when unarmed and in front of such forces? Many special disciplines are needed.
  • Emerging new military disciplines and weapons used in new ways require new types of knowledge, organization and training. Innovations and development of new patterns of behaviour are also required.
  • There is a gap between revolution in military affairs (RMA) and conservative military ideas and organizations. Futurising and rethinking require a new starting point and new perspectives, not just incremental changes of what is already there.

The Information Defence main objective
The Information Defence main objective is:

  • The Information Defence main objective is to achieve information superiority and decision superiority as a foundation for planning and execution of co-operative land, sea, air and information operations. In order to do so the Information Defence executes information operations to achieve information assurance, produces dominant battle-space knowledge, and acts as a focal point for a true and common battle-space picture.
  • The following should be noted. Information and decision superiority is not an eternal realm, but rather a temporary condition within a limited space. Information operations are performed both as a precondition for joint operations and within joint operations.

The Information Defence tasks
The Information Defence tasks are:

  • Command and control (C2) of operations. Linking communicatiohs, information, intelligence and information operations with command and control. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, co-ordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of missions.
  • Operating the communication and information system. Organised collection, processing, transmission, and dissemination of information in accordance with defined procedures, whether automated or manual.
  • Production of intelligence resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information; also information and knowledge through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. There are different types of intelligence: imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurements and signatures intelligence (MASINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), open sources intelligence (OSINT), and technical investigations intelligence (TECHINT).
  • Information operations which are planned information activities in peace and war to affect an adversary, an adversaries information, information systems and processes in order to influence perceptions and behaviour affecting the achievement of military objectives while preventing the effective use of these activities by an adversary. (This description of information operations differs from the US DoD definition: Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.)
  • Providing information assurance (IA) through information operations that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.
  • Command and control warfare (C2W) across the operational continuum and at all levels of conflict. Command and Control Warfare is the integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological
     operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, also in the Swedish view including other signatures warfare (OSW), mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy an adversary’s C2 capabilities while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions. To a great extent C2W is non lethal warfare. (Other signatures warfare are signatures of other types than electromagnetic such as acoustics, hydroacoustics, magnetics, seismics, and emission, of chemical substances.)
  • Linking land, sea, air and information forces. The Information Defence is the cement between land, sea and air forces and also civil defence and coalition forces. Information Defence provides the road map for integrated land, sea, air, and information operations. Thus the
  • Information Defence resembles part of an orchestra where all musicians play the same piece of music and where the Information Defence can also offer solos. The sword is beaten by the brain; in the best case the sword is not even needed.
  • Linking sensors to shooters. This is of extreme importance where tempo is predominant. The architecture and security of the command and communication system is fundamental for the ability to link sensors to shooters securely and fast.
  • Linking assigned missions with civil society and the civil infrastructure. Military defence is more and more dependent on civil infrastructure and thus the link is vital. This makes it necessary to develop a close cooperation with civil organisations responsible for vital functions of society. Military defence can assist to identify civil infrastructure vulnerabilities and to reinforce vital systems. Military defence should consider to develop a new role in this respect.
  • Linking forces with coalition forces. Emerging requirements in collaboration with other nations in order to actively participate in peacepromoting and humanitarian activities.
  • Flexibility to handle all overall objectives: Armed attack, territorial integrity, international operations, and support to the community.
  • Development of new operational, tactical and technical methods, tools and weapons supporting Information Defence. This can be supported by an information operations centre, an infoopcentre, jointly for the forces. Joint capabilities are important because the 10 arena has no distinct boundaries and a variety of targets of opportunities. The situation can be characterized by a mixture of old military disciplines and weapons used in old ways, old military weapons modified and used in new ways, and new military disciplines and weapons used in new ways.

The overall process
Information is collected from the information environment of the world around.
It is processed through a system of communication and information systems
together with defensive and offensive information operations in order to achieve
information superiority as a foundation for decision superiority. Decisions lead
to land, sea, air and information operations and the outcome of these operations
in the world around is again collected as input for further actions.
The system of communication and information systems is composed of the
entire infrastructure, organization, personnel and components that collect,
process, store, transmit, display, disseminate and act on information. Intelligence
is the product of further treatment of some of the information. The objective of
processing information in the system is to produce situation awareness and to
create a common picture of an actual situation as a framework of reference for
co-ordinated operations. The ultimate goal of this process is to achieve dominant
battle-space knowledge. The system of systems architecture is characterized by
Internet type networks with good relationships between operational, systems and
technical views.
The information collection process is supported by information operations
(10). These are actions taken to affect adversary information and information
systems while defending one’s own information and information systems - 10
defend and 10 attack. Information operations are supported by command and
control warfare (C2W) consisting of defend and attack parts. The ultimate goal
of information operations is to achieve information assurance at all times and
together with dominant battle-space knowledge to achieve information
superiority whenever adversaries appear. Information superiority in turn
provides for decision superiority, enhancing friendly and disturbing adversary
decision cycles.
Two types of 10 are recognised. One deals with operations within the whole
infrastructure to achieve information superiority in the planning of battle. The
other deals with operations in conjunction with land, sea, and air operations to
co-operate in massed effects relating to a target.
Command and Control superiority is that kind of dominance which permits
the conduct of C2 without effective opposition.
A metaphor in order to describe the information forces and their part of
defence as a whole can be taken from the world of music. The result of military
operations corresponds to the reactions to the performance of a piece of music in
a concert hall. The military operations themselves correspond to the music.
Land, sea, air and information power correspond to the orchestra. The decision
superiority matches the work of the conductor. Information superiority matches
the sheet of music. Tools for information collection and processing, and tools for
defensive and offensive information operations correspond to the musical
instruments. The world around correspond to the inspiration to compose.
Mobilization for a new era, I said. Will the deepest powershift in human
history come true? The deepest powershift in human history must be met by
reinforcing the knowledge defence. Many new questions will be put in a world
of great change. Under all circumstances through commitment and active hand
in debate we will be supplied with new perspectives and possibilities to develop
our defence in a reasonable direction.
I thank you very much for your patience to listen to this appeal for
mobilization!
 

PDF med originaludgaven af Militært Tidskrift hvor denne artikel er fra:
militaert_tidskrift_128_aargang_mar.pdf

 

References
Toffler, Alvin, ’’Power Shift”, Bantam Books, New York, ISBN 0-553-29215-3
Wik, Manuel W., “Global Information Infrastructure: Threats“ Global
Communications Interactive 1997, Hanson Cooke Limited, ISBN: 0946 393 893,
(http://www.globalcomms.co.uk/interactive/tedtinology/firewall/280.html)
Borg, L., Hamrefors, S., Wik, M., 1998, ’’Information Warfare - A Wolf in
Sheep’s Clothing!” Link from <http://www.infowar.com> Also in Swedish:
Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, 3. häftet 1998

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