Like a Bridge over Troubled Waters? - The Danish Precidency and EU Enlargement

Enlargement Between Scylla and Charybdis

Monday 1 July 2002 will inaugurate Denmark’s sixth Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU).[1] Denmark will thereby have a unique opportunity to reassert its influence in EU politics after a decade of lukewarm engagement. These six months will also mark a turning-point in the history of the EU for the negotiations on the fifth EU enlargement are due to be completed by the end of 2002, allowing up to ten candidate countries to join the Union in 2004.[2] This enlargement is not just the single-largest in the history of the EU; it will also close the fifty-year parenthesis of the Cold War by bringing “Eastern” and “Western” Europe together under the same political roof.

Denmark possesses three assets to carry out this assignment. It benefits from a presumption of innocence, which results from the fact that small states are often less “cluttered with important interests to defend on almost every topic” than larger states.[3] Furthermore, its geographic position at the crossroads of Scandinavian Europe and continental Europe, Western Europe and Eastern Europe makes it a fitting candidate to build bridges between “old” and “future” members of the EU. Finally, Denmark can draw upon a rich experience with enlargement negotiations, both as a candidate itself in the 1970s, and as a full member of the EU. It was indeed under the Danish Presidency in Copenhagen in 1993 that the EU launched the enlargement process. It is now in Copenhagen again that EU top leaders are due to celebrate the end of this process. The wheel will finally have gone full circle - or will it?

These six months will certainly not be a dance on roses. Denmark takes over the Council Presidency at arguably the most difficult point in the negotiations, when enlargement is caught between the Scylla of internal budgetary discipline and the Charybdis of equal treatment between “old” and “new” members. If all proceeds under the Spanish Presidency as expected in the “road map” established by the Commission in the fall 2000, only the so-called “money chapters” will be left for the Danish negotiators: agriculture; regional policy; and financial and budgetary provisions.[4] One can hardly think of more controversial issues. Agriculture and regional policy already represent close to 80% of the EU budget today; and absorbing these ten countries promises to send EU expenditures to record-high ceilings, for most of the applicants will be prime recipients of regional and agricultural funds. The Danish negotiators must all and at once respond to the special needs of the candidate countries, respect the EU imperatives of budgetary discipline within the EU, and give the incumbent recipients of EU farm and regional money sufficient reassurance that they will not be the “victim” of enlargement.  

Who will pay the bill? New or old members? Among old members, those who are the prime recipients of farm and regional money or those who are the richest? Should one first reform the internal policies of the EU - especially the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) - in order to release money for the newcomers? Or should one offer these countries gradual membership in the EU in order to spread the cost of enlargement over time? The number of countries who will join the EU in 2004 depends in large part on the response to these questions. This article explores what room for maneuver the Danish negotiators will have to break the enlargement catch-22.[5] Part I takes stock of the enlargement negotiations. Part II examines the main hurdles standing in the path of the Danish Presidency, namely the budgetary aspects of the enlargement. Finally, part III explores what lessons can be drawn from previous presidencies in order to make the most of the Copenhagen Summit on 12-13 December 2002.

A Ten-Year-Old Process

Enlargement is not a new item on the EU agenda. In fact, it has been discussed for more than a decade, as a result of the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the ensuing reunification of West Germany and East Germany in October 1990. These events suddenly forced EU leaders to think anew their relationship to Central and Eastern Europe. The parenthesis of the Cold War at last could be closed; Europeans could finally put an end to the political barrier that had artificially divided their continent for nearly half a century.

Enlargement was by no means a self-evident solution to the “problems” raised by the transition from Communism. Politically, enlargement was a divisive issue among the “Big Four”, pitting the proponents of a “widening” of the EU (United-Kingdom) against the proponents of a “deepening” of the EU (Italy, France). France was especially wary to see reunified Germany become the center of gravity of a new Mitteleuropa, which explained President Mitterrand’s attempt to temporize by calling for the emergence of a “European Confederation.” Other arrangements - e.g. trade agreements - would also have enabled the economic integration of these countries at a lower cost.

That enlargement eventually imposed itself as the blueprint to reunify the European continent owes a great deal to the activism and entrepreneurship of the European Commission and European Parliament’s President Willy De Clerq.[6] By invoking the founding myths of the European Community and self-images of an open community of liberal, democratic, welfare states, key top officials in the European Commission like President Delors and Commissioner Andriessen contributed to set enlargement on the EU agenda. Later in the process, the Commission played a key role in negotiating an accession strategy with each candidate (screening process), monitoring their progress in adapting to EU legislation (progress reports), and setting a detailed, chapter-by-chapter, timetable for the negotiations (roadmap). In other words, the Commission has acted both as an entrepreneur and as the informal negotiator of enlargement, even if its formal role in the enlargement process is only described as that of a “secretariat of the Council.”

Eventually, however, it is the positions of EU member-states, which have determined the salience of enlargement on the political agenda of the EU. The conclusions of the successive presidencies of the EU Council gives a good overview of the ups and downs in the enlargement process over the last decade. The process started officially in June 1993 in the Copenhagen European Council, when member-states approved the principle of enlargement, provided the prior fulfillment of political and economic criteria by the candidates and the EU alike - the so-called “Copenhagen criteria.”[7] Landmarks in the enlargement process subsequently included: the Madrid European Council in December 1995, where member-states agreed on the broad timetable of the negotiations; the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, where member-states agreed to open as soon as possible the negotiations with the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia;[8] and the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, where member-states opened the negotiations with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia.[9]

 More than four years have now passed since the Foreign Ministers of the EU launched the accession negotiations with the first group of candidates in March 1998. The negotiations cover in all 30 chapters, which represent the entire acquis communautaire: from specific policy areas (such as environmental or social policy) to broad budget and institutional issues. After a long period of slow progress, the negotiations picked up pace in 2001, first under the Swedish presidency and then under the Belgian presidency.[10] Again, the European Commission played a significant role in getting the negotiations off the ground, by producing in the fall 2000 a detailed “road map,” which attributed the successive Presidencies of the EU Council clear priorities in terms of negotiation chapters. By the end of April 2002, the negotiators had made good progress. Cyprus came ahead in the chapter race, with 27 provisionally closed. Most of the ten candidates to enter the EU in 2004 had closed 24 chapters or more, followed unexpectedly close by Bulgaria with 17 chapters. Yet, heavyweight candidates like Poland and Hungary still had not closed delicate chapters like competition, transport (Poland), or justice and home affairs (Hungary).  

In all likelihood, Denmark will thus have to carry out the bulk of the negotiations on the heavy chapters - agriculture, regional, and budget - while closing the negotiations on the pending chapters. This task will by no means be easy.

Last but Not Least: The “Money Chapters”

Money is at the core of the negotiations raised by the last three chapters. Together, agriculture, regional policy and the budget constitute a “Trinity that cannot be separated.”[11] It is precisely why they have been put on ice until the very last stretch of the negotiations

The problem in agriculture is quite simple. The CAP represents about 45% of the EU budget today, despite the fact that the farm sector employs less than 5% of the population of the EU and generates a gross value added of only 2% of the GDP of the EU.[12] The growth of this policy and the chronic inability of EU top officials to reform it in earnest have resulted in striking imbalances between the member-states which are net contributors to the EU budget and those which are net recipients of EU fund. Integrating the future members will be a costly endeavor if one bears in mind that agriculture continues to play a central economic and social role in many of the applicant countries. On average, agriculture represents 20% of total employment in the CEEC-10, i.e., more than four times as much as in the EU. Together, Poland and Romania had more people employed in the farm sector in 2000 (7.5 million) than the EU-15 (6.7 million).[13] In addition, the wealth generated by agricultural value added represents 4.6% of their GDP, i.e., more than the double of the EU-15.[14] Finally, integrating the CEEC-10 will increase the total utilized agricultural area of the EU by 45%.[15] These perspectives are not especially joyful for whoever is concerned to keep farm expenditure under control because a lot of the current farm payments continue to be tied to production output.

The problem in regional policy is also one of financial transfers. Applicant countries are on average much poorer than EU countries. The “income gap” between incumbent and applicant members is in fact nearly 75% greater in the Eastern enlargement than in the case of the Mediterranean enlargements (i.e., Greek accession in 1981, Spanish and Portuguese accessions in 1986).[16] The structural gap between EU countries and the CEECs has reduced along with the candidates’ efforts to restructure their economies. Yet, bridging the gap is a long-term endeavor, and the overall level of prosperity of the EU will fall as a result.[17] The direct consequence is that significant budgetary transfers are likely to take place between the “old” recipients of regional funds and the “new” members, which will receive important support under “Objective 1” of regional policy, targeting the regions with a GDP of less than 75% of the EU average. By way of illustration, the Commission estimated that “under the present rules [and provided candidates are fully integrated in regional policy from day-one] 15 EU regions will lose Objective 1 regional aid after the first enlargement to ten candidate countries” and that “another eight EU regions will lose regional aid” after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria.[18]

The problem for the EU budget ensues from the previous two considerations. Farm and regional expenditures are almost inevitably likely to soar in the wake of enlargement at the same time as the GDP of the EU will be falling significantly. This poses a twofold problem of budgetary redistribution: in the EU, between net contributors to the EU budget and net recipients of EU money; and of course between the EU and the CEEC. Who should pay the enlargement bill? It depends on the answer to two questions: Should the overall resources of the EU be raised (the so-called issue of the “own resource” ceiling)? And, should one reform the CAP and regional policy before enlargement in order to free up money for the newcomers? Four scenarios are possible (figure 1). In the first scenario, there is no reform of the internal policies before the accession of the candidates and there is no revision of “own resource” ceiling. This means that the “new” members are excluded, temporarily or permanently, from a great deal of regional and farm aids, while the pattern of budgetary transfers among “old” members is preserved. This scenario can be called: “new members pay the bill.” In the second scenario, internal policies are reformed before enlargement, but there is no revision of the “own resource” ceiling. Equality of treatment between “new” and “old” members is achieved through a renegotiation of the budgetary transfers among “old” members at the detriment of the prime recipients of farm and regional money. This scenario can be called: “net recipients pay the bill.” In the third scenario, there is no reform of internal policies before the accession of candidates, but incumbent members accept to raise the “own resource” ceiling. The status quo between current net contributors and net recipients is allowed to continue without sacrificing the equality of treatment between “old” and “new” members. This scenario can be called: “net contributors pay the bill.” In the last scenario, there is a reform of internal policies before enlargement and member-states raise the “own resource” ceiling. Accordingly, equality of treatment between “old” and “new” members is achieved in farm and regional policies, as a result of the joint effort of net contributors and net recipients. This scenario can be called: “old members pay the bill.”  


Figure 1 - Who Pays the Enlargement Bill?


 At present, the position of the EU is close to the “new members pay the bill” scenario. Indeed, EU member-states in the Berlin European Council in March 1999 agreed not to raise the “own resource” ceiling of the EU budget, set at 1.27% of the EU’s GNP, and adopted a modest CAP reform. For the first time, the EU thus set out to enlarge without raising its resources. Budgetary discipline was stronger than the consideration of the needs of the future members. One consequence of this agreement was that the future members would, at least until 2006, be excluded from direct farm payments, which represent more than half of the CAP budget. This decision aroused fierce opposition on the part of candidate countries, who pointed to the clearly discriminatory and economically distortive implications of such exclusion.[19]

The Commission has since proposed to modify the Berlin agreement in order to find a middle-ground position between the EU imperative of budgetary discipline and the CEECs’ demand for equal treatment. In its “Information Note” of 30 January 2002, prefiguring its draft common position on the budgetary aspects of enlargement, the Commission thus proposed to “phase in” direct payments in candidate countries over a ten-year period from 2004 to 2013. In addition, it proposed that rural development aid be topped up by 50% compared to the amounts devoted to EU countries (figure 2).

Figure 2: Towards a Compromise? The Commissions Proposals (30.01.2002)

However, fierce opposition arose again, this time on the part of both candidate countries and EU’s “net contributors.” While the former rejected the proposals for being unfair and discriminatory, the latter (especially Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden), have deemed the proposals too generous and have been calling for an urgent reform of the CAP instead.[20] The member-states are to adopt a common position in the Seville Summit on 21-22 June 2002. Yet in all likelihood, the issue will not be settled before the inception of the Danish Presidency. Indeed, one of important steps will take place in the summer of 2002 in conjunction with the release on 10 July of the so-called “mid-term review” of the CAP - a comprehensive examination of the CAP, mandated by the member-states in Berlin in 1999, with a view to suggest needed policy modifications. The net contributors have already announced their intention to seize this opportunity to foster their reform agenda, despite the resistance of the prime recipients of farm benefits (France, Italy, Spain, and Greece).

The Danish Presidency will thus begin in an electric climate. It must solve a difficult two-level negotiation game, taking place on the internal EU front as well as on the EU-CEEC front.


Building Bridges: Three Golden rules

The Danish Presidency will operate under severe time constraints. Finalizing the enlargement in six months will be a real challenge if the negotiations must start from scratch on the money chapters, and a fortiori if compromises are pending on other chapters like transportation, competition, and justice and home affairs.[21] Unexpected items can, in addition, hit the EU agenda and force an across-the board reworking of the Presidency’s agenda: a “No” to a Second Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty; a deadlock on the Kaliningrad and/or on the Cypriot issues; notwithstanding a security crisis, or simply the escalation of EU-US commercial tensions into a full-blown trade crisis, which the Danish presidency would have to tackle at the outset of its mandate.[22] Looking back at previous Presidencies, however, it is possible to identify three “golden rules” or key preconditions of success: keeping items from interfering with enlargement agenda; using the Commission’s input; and precluding last-minute opt-outs.

Undoubtedly the most important precondition of success consists in keeping the agenda focused and manageable. The historical record suggests that the number of priorities should be few and clearly indicated. Sweden thus simplified its original “4+2” program - encompassing four domestic areas and two foreign policy issues - into a more straightforward and workable “Three E’s” program (Employment, Environment, Enlargement).[23] Furthermore, experience from past Presidencies and previous enlargements suggests that it is crucial to keep reform talks separate from enlargement talks. The enlargement to Portugal and Spain shows that the inability or unwillingness to settle the link between reform and enlargement is a cause of delay. The sense of political urgency transpires in the preparatory work for the Danish Presidency. The three key figures of the government (Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller, and EU Affairs Minister Bertel Haarder) have all made it clear that no other issues will be allowed to interfere with the enlargement negotiations - not even a debate on agricultural reform.[24] The Danes’ interpretation of the “Three E’s” would thus be something like “Enlargement-Enlargement-Enlargement.”[25] The signal has been reinforced by the government’s backing of the Commission proposals of 30 January 2002. Under other circumstances, one would have expected the Danish government to join the ranks of the dissatisfied net contributors asking for an urgent reform of the CAP.

        Using the Commission’s input will be a very valuable source of support throughout the negotiations. The Commission has exerted a real influence at all stages of the process. First of all, the Commission is an important agenda-setter. The Berlin negotiations showed how the Commission shaped the agenda by producing a seminal document on EU finances, accompanied by various scenarios to reduce the imbalances between net contributors to the EU budget and net recipients of EU money.[26] The Commission can also press the Council of Ministers to raise beyond the least-common denominator during the decision-making phase. This was visible in the Berlin negotiations, when the Commission refused to back a deal worked out between France and Germany on 9 March on the ground that it was too status quo-oriented. This action led to a more ambitious agreement on 11 March, which was hailed as a victory for the Commission. Finally, the Commission’s influence extends beyond the EU, as European civil servants play the role of “informal negotiators” with the delegations of the candidate countries, helping the latter define their negotiation mandate and monitoring their progress in adopting the acquis communautaire. Compared with the Council Presidency, the Commission has two jockeys at its disposal, when dealing with candidate countries: it can build on continuity and expertise; and it does not represent any member-states. The Commission acts as a “third party.” In fact, it may be the most committed party to enlargement, as Commissioner Verheugen’s “tireless insist[ence] on the absolute priority to be given to enlargement and the need to meet the 2004 deadline” shows.[27] Thus, it has been said that, in external affairs, it is not “the logic of involving both the Commission and the Council presidency [which] is [at] issue,” but “rather what level of intensity, attention and resources can be deployed collectively.”[28] The enlargement negotiations suggest that there are great collective action gains to be derived from a cooperation between the Council Presidency and the Commission.

Finally, a robust agreement must anticipate and preclude the possibility of last-minute opt-outs. A basic rule of thumb is that one should pay special attention to the parties with a major interest at stake. The corollary is that “face-savers” are often useful to win over the adhesion of reluctant partners. The negotiations of the Berlin agreement in March 1999 provide a good illustration of the dubious surprise resulting from Franco-German discord. The two countries are at the core of an agreement on EU finances - France being the major recipient of farm money; Germany the single-largest net contributor to the EU budget. Eager to reduce their contribution to the budget, the Germans had long used the threat of putting agricultural reform to vote in order to bypass French resistance. When put into practice, however, this “solution” proved counter-productive. The agreement reached in the Agriculture Council on 11 March 1999 by qualified majority despite the objections of the French delegation was undone at the last minute by French President Chirac in the Berlin Council.

Conclusion: Where East Meets West

Will the Danish Presidency succeed in completing the enlargement negotiations on schedule? The task may appear daunting; but the mission is not impossible. Much depends on the ability of EU members to agree on a financial deal. A robust agreement, not undone at the last minute by a frustrated party, implies the inclusion of the most sensitive interests and the tactical use of “face-savers.” Until now, the insistence of Danish officials on placing the enlargement at the center of the EU agenda and holding reform proponents at bay is a promising indicator. The Danish Presidency can count on the support of the Commission, which is dedicated to enlargement, is still relatively immune from suspicions of political preference, and has developed invaluable expertise on budgetary and policy issues.

How many countries will make it to the other side of the bridge when Heads of states and governments depart from Copenhagen after the fateful Friday 13 December summit? Once an internal EU agreement is reached on the money chapters, the negotiations will have gone through the roughest part. EU top leaders should still expect bitter discussions with the candidate countries. Yet, the latter bargain from a weak position because they must adapt to the EU (and not the other way round), and because much of the negotiations takes place in bilateral fora. If there is one clear lesson from past enlargements, it is that it is better to “get in first and renegotiate after.” In the end, paradoxically, the most difficult task may thus not be to convince the Central and East European elite of the well-foundedness of EU proposals, but for the same elite to convince their fellow countrymen at home on the eve of the ratification of the accession treaties. This will crave political adroitness and pedagogic sense.

List of References

Avery, Graham, “The Commission’s Perspective on the EFTA Accession Negotiations,” Sussex European Institute Working Paper, 12, 1995.

Cameron, Fraser, “Enlargement: Winning Over the Public,” 2 May 2002, The European Policy Centre,

Euractiv, “The Financing of Enlargement: Regional Policy”

European Commission, EU and Enlargement, Directorate-General for Agriculture, Brussels, 2001a.

European Commission, The Economic Impact of Enlargement, Brussels, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2001b.

European Commission, Financing the European Union, Brussels, Directorate-General for the Budgets, 1998.

Friis, Lykke, “The Danish EU Presidency—A Two-Thirds Presidency?” in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, edited by Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen, Copenhagen, DUPI, 2002.

Friis, Lykke and Anna Jarosz-Friis, Countdown to Copenhagen: Big Bang or Fizzle in the EU’s Enlargement Process? Copenhagen, DUPI, 2002.

Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona and Helen Wallace, The Council of Ministers, London, MacMillan, 1997.

Kerremans, Bart, “Do Institutions Make a Difference? Non-Institutionalism, Neo-Institutionalism, and the Logic of Common Decision-Making in the European Union,”  Governance Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 217-40, 1996.

Mayhew, Alan, “The Negotiating Position of the European Union on Agriculture, the Structural Funds and the EU budget,” SEI Working Paper No.52, Sussex European Institute, 2002a.

Mayhew, Alan, “The Commission’s Proposals for the Enlargement End-Game: Breaking the Golden Rules,” The European Policy Centre,, 17 April 2002b.

Mayhew, Alan, Enlargement of the European Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries, Sussex European Institute Working Paper No. 39, 2000.

Roederer-Rynning, Christilla, Intet Nyt Under Solen? Landbruget i Østudvidelsen, Copenhagen, DUPI, 2002.

Sedelmeier, Ulrich and Helen Wallace, “Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?” in Policy-Making in the European Union, edited by Helen Wallace and William Wallace, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.

Sherrington, Philippa, The Council of Ministers: Political Authority in the European Union, London, Pinter, 2000.

Tallberg, Jonas, “The Power of the Chair in International Bargaining,” Paper prepared for presentation at the ISA Annual Convention, New Orleans, March 24-27, 2002.

Westlake, Martin, The Council of the European Union, 2nd revised edition, London, John Harper, 1999.

[1] The author thanks Lykke Friis for her comments and suggestions, and Sofie Brøndt Jørgensen and Louise Mariegaard for their research assistance.

[2] This group of countries includes Cyprus, Malta, and eight Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs): the Czech Republic; Estonia; Hungary; Latvia; Lithuania; Poland; Slovakia; Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania will join at a later point.

[3] Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, The Council of Ministers, London, MacMillan, 1997, p.147.  

[4] See Alan Mayhew, “The Negotiating Position of the European Union on Agriculture, the Structural Funds and the EU budget,” SEI Working Paper No.52, Sussex European Institute, 2002a.

[5] This article does not examine the impact of the opt-outs inherited from the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 on the Danish Presidency. Indeed, the issues covered by the opt-outs (defense matters, immigration and asylum policy, the single currency, and EU citizenship) are peripheral to the enlargement process and will therefore not have a direct consequence on the accession negotiations since the chapters are already closed. For a detailed discussion of the Danish opt-outs, see Lykke Friis, “The Danish EU Presidency - A Two-Thirds Presidency?” in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, edited by Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen, Copenhagen, Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), 2002, pp.46-64.

[6] As Sedelmeier and Wallace show, Jacques Delors made adroit use of the political “mandate” given by the G7 Summit in July 1989, by initiating the Phare program on behalf of Western industrialized countries: see Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, “Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?” in Policy-Making in the European Union, edited by Helen Wallace and William Wallace, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.433.

[7] The candidate-related criteria are: 1) political: candidates must achieve “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;” 2) economic: “membership requires “the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;” and 3) related to the acquis communautaire: candidates must be able to “take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.” The EU, as far as it is concerned, must be able to “absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration” (Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993).

[8] These countries are often referred to as “the Luxembourg countries” or “the Luxembourg Six.”

[9] These are the “Helsinki countries.”

[10] One observer noted with alarm at the end of 2000 that “there is a strong case for insisting that the negotiations have not yet begun” (See Alan Mayhew, Enlargement of the European Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries, Sussex European Institute Working Paper No. 39, 2000, p.8). For the CEECs, the 1998-2000 period was frustratingly quiet. As far as they were concerned, the negotiations had not really started, and their emissaries denounced the lack of commitment of EU officials: see Lykke Friis and Anna Jarosz-Friis, Countdown to Copenhagen: Big Bang or Fizzle in the EU’s Enlargement Process? Copenhagen, DUPI, 2002, pp.23.

[11] Friis and Jarosz-Friis 2002, p.49.

[12] European Commission, EU and Enlargement, Directorate-General for Agriculture, Brussels, 2001a, p.4

[13] European Commission, 2001a, p.4.

[14] European Commission, 2001a, p.4.

[15] European Commission, 2001a, p.4.

[16] European Commission, The Economic Impact of Enlargement, Brussels, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2001b, p.7.

[17] The Commission estimated that “the GDP per capita of EU-27 [i.e., including Bulgaria and Romania] would be 15 per cent lower than the EU-15 level” of 1998; European Commission 2001b, p.7. 

[18] See Euractiv, “The Financing of Enlargement: Regional Policy”

[19] See Roederer-Rynning, Intet Nyt Under Solen? Landbruget i østudvidelsen, Copenhagen, DUPI, 2002.

[20] For a debate on the Commission proposals, see Alan Mayhew, “The Commission’s Proposals for the Enlargement End-Game: Breaking the Golden Rules,” 17 April 2002 vs. Fraser Cameron, “Enlargement: Winning Over the Public,” 2 May 2002b, on The European Policy Centre website:

[21] It is often said that 80% to 90% of the agenda of a Council Presidency is constrained by the work of previous Presidencies. See Rikart Bengtsson, “Securing Europe: The Swedish Presidency and EU Enlargement,” Paper prepared for presentation at the conference on “EU Enlargement and the Swedish Presidency,” Budapest, Hungary, June 26-27, 2001, p.3.

[22] See Politiken 2 Maj 2002.

[23] Rikard Bengtsson, 2001, p.3.

[24] On the issue of agricultural reform, Bertel Haarder made it clear that “regardless of how far we are in this process, [it] must not stand in the path of the negotiations” Mandag Morgen 2 December 2001, p.18-19. Per Stig Møller declared to the Danish press that “the reform of the structural funds, of regional policy and of the Common Agricultural Policy must not be coupled with the enlargement” Jyllands Posten 22 January 2002.

[25] Friis, 2002, p.56. Charlotte Antonsen, a parliamentarian from the liberal (Venstre) ruling party has since evoked the priorities of the Danish Presidency in the following terms: “we have three priorities... enlargement, enlargement, enlargement. It is very important that we do not mix up enlargement with various new issues”, see Parliamentary questions, Thursday 18 April 2002.  

[26] European Commission, Financing the European Union, Brussels, Directorate-General for the Budgets, 1998.

[27] Mayhew 2002b, p.1.

[28] Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, p.150.

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